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A model has been proposed to simulate the evolution of interpersonal relationships in a social
group. The small social community is simply assumed as an undirected and weighted graph, where
individuals are denoted by vertices, and the extent of favor or disfavor between them are represented
by the corresponding edge weight. One could further define the strength of vertices to describe the
individual popularity. The strength evolution exhibits a nonlinear behavior. Meanwhile, various
acute perturbations to the system have been investigated. In the framework of our model, it is also
interesting to study the adaptive process of a new student joining a class midway.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.65.+b, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
A social network is a set of people with some pattern
of contacts or interactions between them[1, 2]. Cases
that have been studied include the patterns of friend-
ships between individuals[3, 4], business relationships
between corporations[5, 6], and intermarriages between
families[7]. In a social group, all individuals will have
their friends and enemies. Rapoport and others have
once studied friendship networks of school children[4? ],
due to its relatively simple pattern and small sample size.
Recently, Alain Barrat, et al. have proposed a general
model for the growth of weighted networks[? ], consid-
ering the effect of the coupling between topology and
weights’ dynamics. It appears that there is a need for a
modelling approach to complex networks that goes be-
yond the purely topological point. We have proposed a
simple model to simulate the interpersonal relationships
among pupils of a class[8]. In accordance with empiri-
cal observations, similar human relations between people
will promote friendship, while opposite interpersonal re-
lations may lead to hostility. The first impression effect,
as shown in [8], has played a significant role in the evolu-
tion of the interpersonal relations. As a further research
and development of our original work, this paper, with
both analytical and experimental methods, gives a de-
tailed analysis to the evolution behaviors. The reactions
of the system to various perturbations are also investi-
gated.
II. REVIEW THE MODEL
The model system comprises N students and we intro-
duce a N ×N weighted adjacency matrix to describe its
interpersonal relationships. The symmetric matrix ele-
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ments ωij represent the weight of edge eij , where i, j=1,
2, . . . , N . The value of ωij is discrete and can be nega-
tive for the cases of disfavor relationships; each contact
between individuals are supposed to alter weight by ±1
at most. This assumption makes the pairwise interac-
tion moderate; thus, love or hatred in this model is not
formed in seldom contacts. In the original model, we as-
sign value 1 with probability p, and -1 with probability
1-p to the elements of matrix for initialization, where p is
called the initial amity possibility. The definition of the
model is based on the weights’ dynamics:
(i)First, suppose student i has been randomly selected
from the class. Then, he takes the initiative in contacting
student j with possibility:
Wi→j =
|ωij |+ 1∑N
j=1,j 6=i(|ωij |+ 1)
. (1)
Obviously,
Wi→j =Wj→i (2)
The reason to choose this possibility is to avoid the
scenario that student j with ωij=0 cannot be selected by
student i, (for more information, please see Ref[8]).
(ii)Now, i and j have been chosen for interaction. Since
“birds of a feather flock together” and similar human
relations and social environments are likely to promote
friendship, we could define γij as below to describe the
interpersonal relation similarity:
γij = C
−1
∑
α
ωiα · ωαj (3)
where
C =
√∑
α
ω2iα ·
√∑
β
ω2jβ (4)
Apparently, γij=γji and −1 ≤ γij ≤1.
2Then, the rules of revolution are (for more details,
please see our original work[8]):
when γij ≥0
ωij → ωij + 1, ωji → ωji + 1 (5)
with possibility γij , and nothing is altered with possibil-
ity 1− γij ;
when γij <0
ωij → ωij − 1, ωji → ωji − 1 (6)
with possibility |γij |, and nothing is altered with possi-
bility 1−|γij|.
After the weights have been updated (*the symmetry
requirement of the matrix must be satisfied in every up-
date), the process is iterated by randomly selecting a new
individual for the next contact until the class disbands.
The most commonly used topological information
about vertices is their degree and is defined as the num-
ber of neighbors. A natural generalization in the case of
weighted networks is the strength. Define strength si of
node i as below to describe individual popularity:
si =
N∑
j=1
ωij . (7)
We could write the evolution equation of strength si
as bellow:
∂si
∂t
=
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
1
N
Wi→jγij +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
1
N
Wj→iγji (8)
The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (8) de-
scribes all the possible alterations to si at time step t,
contributed by the cases that i is first randomly chosen
and then takes initiative in contacting j; likewise, the
second term describes all contributions from j choosing
i. Given that Wi→j=Wj→i and γij=γji, we could sim-
plify master Eq. (8):
∂si
∂t
=
2
N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Wi→jγij (9)
=
2
N
∑N
j=1,j 6=i(|ωij |+ 1)γij∑N
j=1,j 6=i(|ωij |+ 1)
. (10)
Weight ωij has a certain distribution in the final state
(as shown in Ref.[8]), so do Wi→j and γij . For conve-
nience, we define:
< γ >i=
∑N
j=1,j 6=i(|ωij |+ 1)γij∑N
j=1,j 6=i(|ωij |+ 1)
, (11)
FIG. 1: γ distribution for p=0.00, N=100 and M=50 after
1.0×106 time steps.
FIG. 2: γ distribution for p=1.00, N=100 and M=50 after
1.0×106 time steps.
obviously, | < γ >i | <1.
To obtain the distribution of γ, the range of γ is
equally divided by M . Then, the range [γmin, γmax] be-
comes [γ1, γ2), [γ2, γ3), . . . , [γM , γM+1], where γ1=γmin,
γM+1=γmax. Define nγl as the number of γ between
[γl, γl+1), l=1, 2, . . ., M ; when l=M the interval is
[γM , γM+1]. As shown in Fig. 1, the distribution of γ has
a pinnacle at γ=0. The average value of γ is −0.00118
as calculated. Since now the weight distribution also be-
haves a pinnacle near ω=0[8], it indicates that when the
initial non-diagonal elements(weights) are all −1, the sys-
tem behaves a tardy evolution. Many contacts will give
no alteration to the weights, or equally, the effective con-
tacts between people that change their relations occur in-
frequently. From Fig. 2, one can see that the γ distribu-
tion exhibits a convexity and reaches the maximum near
γ=0.67. γ >0.47 and the average of γ: < γ >=0.66817.
Since the weight distribution nω ∼ ω also displays a con-
3FIG. 3: weight evolution for N=100 after 1.0×107 time steps.
Initially, all the weights are set +1, except ω0=-100, where ω0
denotes the designated negative weight.
vexity at ω >0, the effective contacts between individuals
are quite frequent. Above results would be reviewed in
the next section.
III. PERTURBATIONS AND EVOLUTIONS
In the original model, we suppose that individuals at
first are not familiar with each other. The initial config-
uration of the system is determined by the initial amity
possibility p. It can be interpreted as the first impression
among them. However, it is completely possible that two
individuals have good fellowship or a deep grievance pre-
viously. Plotted in Fig. 3 is ω0 ∼ t for the process of
an old grievance thawing in an initial harmonious group
(p ≈1.00). ω0, which denotes the old grievance between
two from the very beginning, rises sharply from -100 to
0, and increases gently afterwards. This phenomenon
can be interpreted from two aspects. On the one hand,
the new environment provides them sufficient opportuni-
ties to contact other people, so they would not encounter
frequently and aggravate their greivance. On the other
hand, they both will get on well quickly with new individ-
uals, due to p ≈1.00 (see Ref.[8]). Thus, after sufficient
contacts they will have common friends who will play a
conciliatory role in mitigating their old grievance.
All too often, a group has its leader who has great rev-
erence among his people. He may be an elder chief, a
captain of a football team or a chairman of an associa-
tion. The other members of the group may have some
conflicts and grievances. We are interested in the role of
the leader playing in the development of the collective.
For simplicity, we could assign a large integer to the ma-
trix elements at row i (ωij=ωji and ωii=0) to denote the
leader’s relations, and set all the other non-diagonal ele-
ments as -1. In Fig. 4, we have taken this integer as 100.
Apparently, the leader’s strength grows linearly with the
FIG. 4: strength evolution for N=50, M=50 and p=0.00 af-
ter 2.0×107 time steps. The dot line (with slop 0.03167) fits
the strength evolution of the leader, and blacksquare() rep-
resents the strength of others, circle(◦) denotes the strength
evolution without the leader, under the same conditions. The
data are drawn out at intervals of 4.0×106 time steps.
passage of time, while the strength of his members in-
creases with a relatively slow velocity. By comparison
with the evolution containing no leader, one could con-
clude that the strengths of the system have been boosted
up by the leader. The slope of the leader’s popularity
evolution is 0.03167. In section 2, we have given that:
∂si
∂t
= 2 < γ >i /N. (12)
For the case containing the leader: if we assume that
ωkj ≪ ωij for all j and i 6= k, then γij ≈1, and fur-
ther ∂si/∂t=2/N=0.04, in approximate agreement with
the experimental results. For the case absent the leader:
the average speed of their popularity growth can be also
estimated. If we suppose < γ >i≈< γ >=−0.0118 (as
mentioned in section 2), then Eq. (12) gives the average
velocity of popularity growth −7.2×104, which is quite
low. But as one can see in Fig. 4, their strengths are dis-
persed at a certain time (nonlinear property). Note that
the master equation (8) can only give an average rate of
popularity growth. The leader has changed the possible
state of disunity and make his men draw together.
It is also interesting to study the opposite case. We
could put a public anti into a united group to see the
strength evolution of the system, see Fig. 5. For initial-
ization, we assign −100 to the matrix elements at row
i (ωij=ωji and ωii=0) to represent the anti’s relations,
and set all the other non-diagonal elements as 1 to de-
scribe the initial public. Obviously, the anti’s popularity
decreases linearly, while the strength of the public rises
at a relatively slow speed (approximate linear). By com-
paring with the case with no anti, one could see that the
strength evolution of the public has not been changed
significantly by the anti. The anti’s incompatibility to
4FIG. 5: strength evolution for N=50, M=50 and p=1.00 af-
ter 2.0×107 time steps. The dot line (with slop -0.0425) fits
the strength evolution of the public anti, and blacksquare()
represents the strength of the public, circle(◦) denotes the
strength evolution without the anti, under the same condi-
tions. The data are drawn out at intervals of 4.0×106 time
steps.
the public is aggravated. Recall that < γ >=0.67 in sec-
tion 2, and suppose < γ >j≈< γ > (for j 6= i). We
could estimate the growth rate of the public strength as
2 < γ >j /N ≈ 2 < γ > /N=2 × 0.76/50=0.0304. The
slope of the anti’s popularity evolution is −0.0425. It
is reasonable to assume that |ωkj | ≪ |ωij | for all j and
i 6= k, then γij ≈ −1, and further ∂si/∂t=2/N=−0.04,
in fine agreement with the experimental results.
It must be stressed that the strength growth is ac-
tually nonlinear. As Fig. 6 indicates, the trace of the
strength evolution behaves linear initially, but nonlinear
afterwards. Experiments demonstrate that the strength
evolution exhibits obvious nonlinear behaviors after suf-
ficient time, whatever the initial state. When p=1.00, it
has a widest linear zone, but finally, it splits. We would
like to discuss the adaptive process of a student join-
ing a class midway. Plotted in Fig. 8 (log-log scale) is
the strength evolution of the system on the background
of p=1.00. The old students’ popularity grows linearly,
even after inserting the new one. One could see the non-
linear growth for the new-coming pupil, whose popular-
ity grows approaching the asymptote of the old students’
strength evolution. The adaptive process for the new is
quite short, thanks to the harmonious group.
IV. OUTLOOK AND APPLICATIONS
This paper is focused on discussing various perturba-
tions and corresponding evolutions of our original model,
which is proposed to study the student relationships in
a class. Both experimental and analytical methods have
FIG. 6: strength evolution for N=10, p=0.00 after 2.0×107
time steps.
FIG. 7: strength evolution of a student joining midway:
N=49 and p=1.00. The new student joins the class after
4.0×105 time steps, and his evolution is denoted by ♦. the
strength evolution of old students are denoted by . We have
extracted 5 from them as representatives.
been used to learn human relations in a local group. The
generalization of the model to describe the real social net-
works is still a challenging problem. (to be continued.)
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